Effect of Board Size and Duality on Corporate Social Responsibility: What has Improved in Corporate Governance in Asia? by Alabdullah, Tariq Tawfeeq Yousif et al.
RESEARCH ARTICEL
published: 31 July 2019
doi: 10.21070/jas.v3i2.2810
 
 
ISSN 2548-3501 (online)
Edited by:
Eny Maryanti
Reviewed by:
Rahmawati
*Correspondence:
Tariq Tawfeeq Yousif Alabdullah
tariqtariq1984@gmail.com
Received: 10 June 2019
Accepted: 12 July 2019
Published: 31 July 2019
Citation:
TTYA, ERA and MM (2019) Effect of
Board Size and Duality on
Corporate Social Responsibility:
What has Improved in Corporate
Governance in Asia?.
Journal of Accounting Science. 3:2.
doi: 10.21070/jas.v3i2.2810
Effect of Board Size and Duality on
Corporate Social Responsibility:
What has Improved in Corporate
Governance in Asia?
Tariq Tawfeeq Yousif Alabdullah 1*, Essia Ries Ahmed 2, Mohammed Muneerali 3
1Accounting Department, College of Administration and Economics, University of Basrah, Iraq, 2Collage of Economics,
Management and Information Systems, University of Nizwa, Oman, 3Collage of Economics, Management and Information
Systems, University of Nizwa, Oman
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between board size and CEO dual-
ity, and corporate social responsibility (CSR). A total of 91 public listed companies from
Bursa Malaysia representing the sample of the current study were selected. Secondary
data were used and sourced from annual report on the companies. Using descriptive
statistics, the existence and the extent of CSR disclosure on Malaysian companies were
ascertained. An analysis of the quantitative data was then made using the Partial Least
Squares (PLS). The findings from this research show that the role of board size suggest a
significant and positive relationship with CSR disclosure. On the other hand, CEO dual-
ity on CSR disclosure indicates a negative relationship. This research contributes to the
existing literature in terms of the roles of board Size and CEO duality on CSR initiatives.
Furthermore, It highlights the necessity of following the new trends in corporate gover-
nance field by investigating its mechanisms with the new trendsin financial Industry from
Islamic perspective as this might be positively added to the field of corporate governance
due to the high significant role for these two fields.
Keywords: Corporate governance, CEO duality, Board size, CSR, Asia
Penelitian ini menguji hubungan antara ukuran dewan (komisaris) dan dualitas CEO,
serta tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan (CSR). Sampel yang diambil untuk penelitian
ini adalah 91 perusahaan publik dari Bursa Malaysia. Data sekunder yang digunakan
bersumber dari laporan tahunan perusahaan. Untuk memastikan pengungkapan CSR
pada perusahaan Malaysia, peneliti menggunakan metode statistik deskriptif. Analisis
data kuantitatif dilakukan dengan menggunakan Partial Least Squares (PLS). Hasil dari
penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa ukuran dewan komisaris memiliki hubungan yang
signifikan dan positif dengan pengungkapan CSR. Di sisi lain, dualitas CEO memiliki
hubungan negatif dengan pengungkapan CSR. Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada liter-
atur yang sudah ada terkait dengan peran ukuran dewan komisaris dan dualitas CEO
pada pelaksanaan CSR. Selain itu, penelitian ini juga menyoroti perlunya mengikuti tren
baru dalam bidang corporate governance (tata kelola perusahaan) dengan menyelidiki
mekanismenya dengan tren baru dalam industri keuangan dari perspektif Islam karena
hal ini dapat ditambahkan secara positif ke dalam bidang tata kelola perusahaan karena
signifikan peran yang tinggi dari kedua bidang tersebut.
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INTRODUCTION
Countries in both developed and developing economies putmore attention on dealingwith cor-
porate governance in their corporations Abushammala et al. (2015) . The reason behind that is
that CG has played essential role in operating and controlling the framework of the organiza-
tions (Alabdullah et al. (2016) ; Alabdullah (2018a) ; Alfadhl andAlabdullah (2013).This system
increases the interest of the shareholders via relying on set of robust mechanisms and princi-
ples of corporate governance to control the actions of the companies based on principles of
disclosure and transparency. Corporate governance has received attention because it positively
affects the performance and value of the company (Alabdullah et al. (2016) ; Alabdullah et al.
(2014b); Alfadhl and Alabdullah (2013) because applying such a system has its positive impact
on market growth and economic growth (Abushammala et al. (2015) , Alabdullah (2016)). CG
can be utilized as a building block for the firms to maximize their value by creating a compet-
itive advantage, enabling their performance to be enhanced and thereby leading to an overall
improvement in a country’s economy (Alabdullah (2016a) ; Alabdullah (2016b). Larger board
size has a positive impact on firm performance with its two measurements: Return on Assets
(ROA) and Return on Equqity (ROE), (Alabdullah et al. (2018) ; Alabdullah (2016c) CG is
a source of much interest worldwide as it is a useful tool to reduce or mitigate any business
crises on the one hand, and on the other CG can be utilized as a building block for the firms
to maximize their value by creating a competitive advantage, enabling their performance to be
enhanced and thereby leading to an overall improvement in a country’s economy Alabdullah
(2016d) . It is recommended that corporate entities should promote corporate governance to
send a positive signal to potential investors.The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) should continue
enforcing and encouraging firms to adhere to good corporate governance for financial institu-
tions for efficiency and effectiveness and regulatory agencies including the government should
promote and socialise corporate governance and its relationship to firm performance across
industries (Alabdullah et al. (2018) ; Mang’unyi (2011) . Adopting one corporate governance
proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. The market reaction is larger in firms with more
antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism for pro-
posals sponsored by institutions (Cuñat et al. (2012) . There is no comprehensive, “one size fits
all” global corporate governance or CSR system, based on western codes and regulations that
can be implemented in emerging markets (Lenssen et al. (2011)). Stronger governance mecha-
nisms would reduce opportunistic management behavior, thus improving the quality and reli-
ability of earning management (Gulzar (2011) .It indicates that larger and improved boards are
associated with a greater depth of intellectual knowledge, which in turn helps in improving
decision-making and enhancing the performance (Arora and C.Sharma (2016) . Good corpo-
rate governance is imperative to all organizations and must be encouraged for the interest of all
stakeholders (Alabdullah (2018a)
Corporate governance ismanifested through various dimensions.These include code of cor-
porate governance, board independence, skills, size, committees experience and board diversity
(Dewji and Miller (2013) ; Narwal and Jindal (2015)). Banks with strong corporate governance
practices had substantially higher stock returns in the aftermath of the market meltdown, indi-
cating that good governancemay havemitigated the adverse influence of the crisis on bank cred-
ibility (Peni and Vähämaa (2012)). The motivation factor of corporate governance is evidenced
especially in non-financial companies. Whilst financial companies cited that their Enterprise-
WideRiskManagement (EWRM)practiceswere not only being driven by corporate governance
compliance, but also for good business practice and improved decision making. In addition the
motives of its implementation ensured the survival of the company and value creation (Alab-
dullah et al. (2016) ; Manab et al. (2010); Alabdullah and Ahmed (2018)). Another study they
found that more socially responsible firms enjoy more favorable credit ratings. In particular, an
increase in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by one standard deviation improves the firm’s
credit rating by as much as 4.5% (Jiraporn et al. (2014)). Enterprises must focus on productive
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stakes in the global economy, and include social responsibility “which creates long-term sus-
tainability for corporate success by meeting the needs of all suppliers, investors and employees”
into their ownership advantage. The perspective and implementation of CSR has important
consequences for Multinational Enterprises through FDI in fostering development (Tai and
Chuang (2014)). Firms should continue to adopt corporate governance for ethical reasons to
meet stakeholder’s social and environmental needs for sustainable development (I.Dzingai and
Fakoya (2017) . It hasmentioned that the board independence andmeeting frequencymoderate
the relationship between return on equity and return on assets by enhancing board characteris-
tics and the firms’ performance indicators measures among corporate governance mechanisms
(Palaniappan (2017) . Turkey Corporate Governance Index (TCGI) predicts higher market
value (with firm fixed effects) and higher firm-level profitability with firm random effects. The
principal subindex which predicts higher market value and profitability, and drives the results
for TCGI as a whole, is disclosure subindex and also found that the determinants of firms’ gov-
ernance and its most firm-specific factors have little effect on firms’ governance choices (Ararat
et al. (2017)). With rising stakeholder concerns over sustainable development, corporate social
responsibility (CSR) has become key for the business community, moving the business model
beyond financial performance to a new voluntary paradigm based on natural resource conser-
vation, social welfare, stakeholder engagement and economic performance (Aitsidhoum and
Serra (2018) ; Alabdullah et al. (2014c). Improved corporate governance has leads investors
more optimistic and have more trust in Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) issuers when they
believe they are better protected (Chen (2017) . Social expectations had the greatest impact on
both stakeholder pressure and green practice adoption. Moreover, they found that the higher
the job titles were, the more willing they were to adopt green practices and it indicated that
the current top management of Korean logistics companies is well aware of being mandated to
make a commitment to corporate environmental responsibility and green practices (Lee et al.
(2018)).
Recently, regulatory in several countries have demonstrated their needs for new corporate
governance (CG) to enhance the transparency in corporations. In Asia, the financial crisis led
to shed light to the need for more evidence and events on the issues of CG and transparency.
Especially the increasing of corruption situations (Ahmed et al. (2019) ; Alabdullah (2018b)
; Alabdullah (2016) ; Alabdullah et al. (2014a); Alfadhl and Alabdullah (2013) ; Abushammala
et al. (2015).
Ehikioya (2009) mentioned that recent financial disturbance in Asia in the late 1990s with
several scandals in Enron, World Com and other related firms has again encouraged investors,
policy makers, and other stakeholders to take interest towards good CG. In Asian countries
such as Jordan. For instance, Alabdullah et al. (2018) discussed the relation of non-executive
directors; and the board of directors’ size, and growth/capital structure in a sample of 100 firms
that was made available by nonfinancial sector in Jordan. The results showed that increasing
the number of non-executive directors in the board, in another meaning increasing size of the
board has a negative and significant effect on capital structure.
Researchers classify three key roles; resource dependence and control. In Asia, the role of
resource dependence such as board of directorsmembers offers information to topmanagement
and resources is clearer than other two roles. It is important because it shows that top manage-
ment might choose board members in order to develop the companies rather than focusing
on controlling and monitoring the management (Fan (2004) .Unlike many recent studies that
focused on financial companies, the current study discusses corporate governance’ studies that
applies in companies belong to non-financial listed companies in some countries in the develop-
ingmarkets.With regard to studies done inAsia, Fan andWong (2001) recommended that Big 5
auditors in Asia have a role of corporate governance and they are likely to focus on transparency
in companies’ financial statements and reports as they have a better reputation to uphold; might
be more independent than local companies; concentrate larger legal liability for making errors,
and they probably perceived disclosure quality because of their recognizable and prominent
names.
Based on the literature that have been done in Asia, it is clearly appeared that there is still
no improvement in the field of corporate governance .Alternatively, new trends in the business
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world have been given an concentrated consideration to the financial Industry from Islamic
perspective due to the financial crises and drawbacks as an substitute option through using
instruments based on the real economic (Ahmed et al. (2014a) ; Ahmed et al. (2016) ; Ahmed
et al. (2018a) ; Ahmed et al. (2014b) ; Ahmed et al. (2014c) ; Ahmed et al. (2019) ; Ahmed
(2010)), and this provides more concentration to the risk management in the instruments of
Islamic financial (Ahmed et al. (2019) ; Ahmed et al. (2018b) ; Ahmed et al. (2015) ; Ahmed et al.
(2014c) Ahmed et al. (2015) , Ahmed et al. (2013a) ; Ahmed et al. (2012); Ahmed and Zuqibeh
(2013) Ahmed and Zuqibeh (2013) ; Ahmed et al. (2013b) . Other studies in the same line
also take in their account the moderating role shariah supervisory board from the perspective
of Sukuk documentation and legitimacy as the study done by Ahmed et al. (2018b) and also
previous studies like Ahmed et al. (2018c) dealt with themoderating role of Shariah supervisory
board in its effect on sukuk pricing benchmark.This new and important trend should be tested
and considered by the future studies.
Board of directors is one of the important essentials of corporate governance tool in man-
agement to ensure the company’s business is being properly managed by their agents.Past stud-
ies suggested that board size effects will increased communication and coordination problems,
decreased ability of the board to control management and the spread among a larger group
of the cost of poor decision making (Lipton and lorsch (1992) . Besides that Jizi et al. (2014)
explained firms with larger boards are likely to disclose more CSR related information. The
results indicate that, possibly because banks are complex organizations, having a larger number
of directors share the work has a positive impact on the firm’s attitude towards its stakeholders.
The relationship of CEO duality and level of CSR disclosure were studied by prior
researchers. Some of the studies concluded there is no relationship between CEO duality
and CSR disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay (2006); Fan and Wong (2001) . However, Gul and
Leung (2004) reported negative and significant relationship between CEO duality and the level
of CSR disclosure. According to them when the CEO was holding chairman position the CSR
disclosure was lower compared with company which had no CEO duality issue.
Prior studies presented positive relationship with board size and various type of CSR dis-
closure. M.Halme and .Huse (1997) and Rao et al. (2012) Rao et al. (2012) analyzed and con-
cluded positive relationship of board size and environmental disclosure . Cheng and Courtenay
(2006), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) indicated board size has positive relation with voluntary cor-
porate disclosure. Said et al. (2009) shows that positive relationship between board size and CSR
disclosure index. Hence, it is hypothesized that:
H1: Board size positively associates with CSR.
Separating the positions of CEOandChairman of the board possibly encouraged to enhance
the observation of the board director’s activities (Jensen (1993)). Companies with CEO and also
holding chairman spot have greater chances to be related to the minor levels of quality of CSR
disclosure. This is because the board is less motivated to monitor the companies transparency
might be used to conceal frau and incompetence.
According to Forker (1992) and Gul and Leung (2004) , CEO duality reduces overall
accountability, making the companies less transparent for all relevant stakeholders. Yuen et al.
(2008) whom researched on the influence of ownership features, corporate governance mech-
anism and firm specific features on the CSR disclosure of randomly selected 200 public listed
companies in China and found a negative relationship between CEO duality and the extent
of disclosures. This is supported by empirical studies such as Uwalomwa and Ajibolade (2013)
; Michelon and Parbonetti (2012)
Hence, it is hypothesized that:
H2: CEO duality is negatively impacts CSR
METHOD
This study used quantitative approach,the sample size consists of 125 companies from trading
and service, construction and properties industry that listed onMainMarket of BursaMalaysia.
Content analysis was used to gather data from annual report 2018. Statistical tools such as
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SmartPLS version 3.0 and SPSS were used to analyze the collected data.
CSR : When a firm disclosed items related to CSR in annual report the firm will be given
scored ‘1’ while firm failed to disclose will be given ‘0’ score. This scoring approach is chooses
due to the simplicity and less controversial as it lessen the possible scoring bias and scaling
issues in measuring the score (Haniffa and Cooke (2005) . The total scores that a company can
be achieved are 26 based on the listed checklist items.
Themeasurement for board size and CEO duality used in this study showTable 1This infor-
mation was collected from the annual report of the firm.
[Table 1 about here.]
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The total sample used in this study is 125 firms from three main industries namely trading and
services, properties and construction. Table 2 showed the composition of sample.The 125 firms
choose randomly from overall population 352 inclusive trading and service, construction and
property industry. Samples 45 taken from trading and services, 34 from construction and 46
from property. Frequency analysis of 125 samples is conducted by using the latest version of
SPSS software. Frequency analysis measures the validity of sample and to check whether any
missing sample for each variable.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 3 explains the frequency analysis of board size in the companies. The least board size is 4
and 3 companies out of 125 had this size.The highest frequency is 20%which carries 8 directors
in the board and most firms have this size. This was followed by 7 directors in the board which
carried about 18.4%. Only 1 firm had the 12 director size which carried 0.8%.
[Table 3 about here.]
Besides board size, this study also analyzes the CEO duality. Table 4 explains only 9 companies
out of 125 had CEO duality in the board of directors. It was equaled to 7.2% in total sample.
[Table 4 about here.]
Structural Model Path Coefficient
The path coefficient is significant when the t-value is more than critical value. Computed
PLS structural model can be seen in Table 5 showed the path coefficient and R2 after run the
PLS algorithm.
[Table 5 about here.]
** p < 0.01, *p <0.05
Table 5 abridged the path coefficient, standard deviation and t-value for each independent
variable to dependent variable relationship. H1 analyze board size have positive relationship
with CSR Disclosure. This explains the larger board size will disclose high CSR activities. The
result for H1 indicates, it is statistically significant (path coefficient = 0.148, t-value = 1.667),
thus H1 accepted.
Hypothesis H2 proposed that CEO duality have negative relationship with CSR disclosure.
The result not supported H2 which statically significant at p<0.05 and negatively related (path
coefficient = -0.110, t-value = 1.351), thus H2 was rejected.
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IMPACT THE BOARD SIZE ON CSR
Board size was obtained by measuring the total number of directors in the board. Zahra and
Pearce (1989) explained when the board size is large it will reduce CEO ability to dominate the
board of directors. Besides that large board size alsowill increase the transparency inmonitoring
top management choices and engagements (Mak and Roush (2000) . Prior researchers have
found positive and significant relationship between board size and CSR disclosure in Malaysia
(Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) ; Said et al. (2009)
The findings of this study in align with previous researches. H1 projected large board size
will endorse high level of CSR disclosure.The outcome from this study discover that board size
do effect the relationship with CSR disclosure as the results is significant. This result similar
with previous studies by Sadou et al. (2017) which the author studied on CSR disclosure on
larger companies. The purpose of the study was to test on the enhancement in the range and
quality of CSR disclosure in Malaysia. Sadou et al. (2017) concludes that companies with larger
board size disclosed expressively more CSR facts. On the other Akbas (2016) studied on the
relationship between board characteristics and environmental disclosure by examining 62 non-
financial Turkish firms. The author also found statistically significant and positive relationship
between board size and environmental disclosure. This can be further justify by analysis the
sample , for example the highest board size 15 in the sample was obtained byMalaysia Airports
Holdings Berhad and they scored total 16 scores out of total 25 scores in CSR disclosure. Most
of the companies that score in between 15- 23 out of total 25 scores have bigger board size in
range of 8-15 directors. As overall, the findings showed there is significantly positive relationship
between board size andCSR disclosure.The bigger the board size of the company, themore CSR
disclosure the company will disclosure.
Impactthe CEO Duality on CSR
CEO duality happens when the CEO of the company holds chairman position as well in the
board of directors. Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed when there is CEO duality in the
board it has weaker observation from the board. Some previous revisions identified negative
association of CEO duality and CSR disclosure ( Gul and Leung (2004)). H2 suggested that
CEO duality has significant relationship with disclosure of CSR. The findings has negative and
insignificant relationship with CSR disclosure. This is in align with research by Majumder et al.
(2017) .The research study about the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
social disclosure and find insignificant negative association with CSR disclosure. In addition
the findings also supporting the study of Ahmad et al. (2017) which discuss about the impact of
CEO duality in corporate social reporting.The findings support there is negative nonsignificant
relationship between CEO duality and CSR reporting. Based on the sample size 125, only 9
companies have the duality which indicates a very low duality rate in Malaysia under trading
and services , construction and properties industry. This also supports the fact that majority
of Malaysian firms complied with the suggestion of Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance
(2012) where company should have a clear and separate role of chairman and CEO.
When the CEO in the board composition they tend to be more cautious to disclose CSR
information. They might only report positive activities and out guard negative news to pro-
tect management reputation and capability. Besides that they avoid to disclose any negative
news referring CSR to protect shareholders engagement. In this case the CSR disclosure will be
lower because CEO dominance can impact the board decision. However as overall, the finding
resulted CEO duality have negative impact and statistically non-significant to CSR .
CONCLUSIOAN
Thefindings of the present study provide a substantial discovery in thetrading and service, con-
struction and properties industry that listed onMainMarket of Bursa Malaysiafor the relation-
shipbetween board size and CEO duality on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Malaysian
listed companies. Generally, the role of board size suggest a significant and positive relation-
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ship with CSR disclosure. While CEO duality on CSR disclosure indicate a negative relation-
ship.Thus, authorities shouldconsider more analysis on this link and its contributions and pos-
sibleimprovements to CSR among Malaysian listed companies in the trading and service, con-
struction and properties industry. CSR reporting have become a mandatory disclosure from
voluntary disclosure. For as Malaysia, the government make it compulsory to publicly listed
companies to disclose the CSR information in their annual reports. When companies focus
on CSR they are not only driven their companies to be profitable leaders but also has posi-
tive effect from socially responsibility perspective. In that, that The new improvement done by
the current study is that it focuses on the link of corporate governance characteristics, earn-
ing management to CSR disclosure by moderating internal audit function.The sample size was
125 companies under trading and services, construction and properties industry. These com-
panies selected as control variable for some a few reasons. First, both industries showed have a
positive growth in the Malaysian GDP 2016 which probably earnings management takes place
in the companies. In addition, construction and properties tend to be environmental intensive
since they might give bigger impact on the nature. So corporations be likely to disclose more
on environmentally friendly. Further, these industries tended to create more waste compared
finance and banking. The possible waste emanation to air, water and land can lead to crucial
environmental problem. The current study also revealed the importance of getting new trends
in corporate governance field via taking into account testing the link between corporate gover-
nance mechanisms and financial Industry from Islamic perspective in Asia. The current study
strongly recommended the future researchers to focus on both corporate governance and finan-
cial Industry from Islamic perspective as a new trend might be positively added to the field of
corporate governance or to be linked with it due to the significance for these two fields.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors wish to acknowledge Eny Maryanti from Universitas Muhammadiyah Sidoarjo,
Indonesia for her assistance in publishing this paper, her help is greatly appreciated.
REFERENCES
Abushammala, S. N., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., and Ahmed, E. R.
(2015). Causal Relationship between Market Growth and
Economic Growth. Comparison Study. European Journal
of Business and Management 7.
Ahmad, N. B. J., Rashid, Afzalur, and Gow, J. (2017). Board
Independence and Corporate Social Responsibility (Csr)
Reporting In Malaysia. Australasian Accounting, Business
and Finance Journal 11, 61–85.
Ahmed, E. R. (2010). Factors Influencing the Involvement
in Shubuhat Activities: The Case of Shari ‘ah-Complaint
Companies in Bursa Malaysia. vol. June 2010, In IBAF
International Conference on Islamic banking & finance in
Kuala Lampur., ed. and others.
Ahmed, E. R., Aiffin, K. H. B., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., and Zuqe-
bah, A. (2016). Zakat and Accounting Valuation Model.
Journal of Reviews on Global Economics 5, 16–24.
Ahmed, E. R., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Amran, A., and Yahya,
S. B. (2018a). Indebtedness Theory and Shariah Boards:
A Theoretical Approach. Global Business & Management
Research 1.
Ahmed, E. R., Alabdullah, T. Y., Islam, M. A., and M.Asmar
(2014a). Sukuk Legitimacy: A New Measurement Based
on Content Analysis. In 16th Malaysian Finance Associa-
tion Conference in Sasana Kijang Central Bank ofMalaysia,
Kuala Lumpur, (Kuala Lumpur).
Ahmed, E. R., Amran, A., and Islam, M. A. (2018b). Sukuk
documentation and legitimacy: the role of shariah super-
visory board as a moderator. Management 5, 22–40.
Ahmed, E. R., Islam, A., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., and Amran, A.
(2019). A Qualitative Analysis on The Determinants of
Legitimacy of Sukuk. Journal of Islamic Accounting and
Business Research 10.
Ahmed, E. R., Islam, A., Zuqibeh, A., and Alabdullah, T. Y.
(2014b). Risks Management in Islamic Financial Instru-
ments. Advances in Environmental Biology 8, 402–406.
Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., and Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2018c).
The moderating role of Shariah supervisory board on
sukuk pricing benchmark. International Journal of Excel-
lence in Islamic Banking and Finance 6.
Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., Ariffin, B., Halim, K., and
Moniruzzaman, M. (2013a). Contemporary Challenges
And Prospects of Sukuk. Journal of Self-Governance &
Management Economics, 1–1.
Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., and Ariffin, K. H. K. (2015). An
Empirical Analysis on Legitimacy of Sukuk: An Insight of
Malaysian Sukuk. Asian Social Science 11, 84–84.
Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., and Harthy, F. N. (2013b). The
Relationship between Shareholders and Shubuhat: A Study
on the Islamic Banks in Malaysia. Journal of Asian Scien-
tific Research 3, 538–538.
Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., and .Y.Alabdullah, T. (2014c).
Islamic Sukuk: Pricing Mechanism and Rating. Journal of
Asian Scientific Research 4, 640–648.
Ahmed, E. R., Yahaya, S., and M.Harashid. (2012). Shubuhat
onMatter of Bai’alinah and Tawarruq. . International Jour-
nal of Business and Technopreneurship 2, 85–101.
Ahmed, E. R. and Zuqibeh, A. (2013). The Role of Shariah
Supervisory Board in the Reviewing and Supervision on
Takaful (Islamic Insurance). Insurance and Takaful Jour-
nal. INTAJ.
Journal of Accounting Science j ojs.umsida.ac.id/index.php/JAS
127
July 2019 j Volume 3 j Issue 2
Tariq Tawfeeq Yousif Alabdullah Effect of Board Size
Aitsidhoum, A. and Serra, T. (2018). Corporate sustainable
development. Revisiting the relationship between corpo-
rate social responsibility dimensions. Sustainable Devel-
opment 26, 365–378.
Akhtaruddin, M., Hossain, M. A., Hossain, M., and Yao, L.
(2009). Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure
in Corporate Annual Reports of Malaysian Listed Firms.
Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016).
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016a). Corporate Governance from
The Perspective ofThe Past andThe Present andTheNeed
to Fill an International Gap. Risk Governance & Control:
Financial Markets & Institutions 6.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016b). The Performance of Companies
andThe Board’s Characteristics From the New Perspective
of Manipulation Avoidance. Corporate Ownership & Con-
trol 13, 279–286.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016c). Are Board Size and Owner-
ship Structure Beneficial in EmergingMarkets’ Firms? Evi-
dence From Jordan. International Journal of Management
& Information Systems (IJMIS) 20, 87–94.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016d). Corporate governance from the
perspective of the past and the present and the need to fill
an international gap. Risk Governance and Control: Finan-
cial Markets and Institutions 6, 96–101.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2018a). The relationship between own-
ership structure and firm financial performance: Evidence
from Jordan. Benchmarking: An International Journal 25,
319–333.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2018b). The relationship between own-
ership structure and firm financial performance: Evidence
from Jordan. Benchmarking: An International Journal 25,
319–333.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. and Ahmed, E. R. (2018). Corporate
Governance: To What Extent it is important in the Arab
Countries?, . International Journal of Science and Research,
Vol.7(11).
Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Alfadhl, M. M. A., Yahya, S., and Rabi, A.
M. A. (2014a). The Role of Forensic Accounting in Reduc-
ing Financial Corruption: A Study in Iraq. International
Journal of Business and Management 9, 26–26.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Nor, M. I., and E.Ries (2018). The Deter-
mination of Firm Performance in Emerging Nations: Do
Board Size and Firm Size Matter. Management 5, 57–66.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Yahya, S., Nor, M. I., and Majeed, F. Q.
(2016). An Investigation of Corporate Governance From
a New Perspective: ExaminingThe Financial Performance
of Companies andThe Impact of Executive Turnover. Cor-
porate Board: Role, Duties & Composition 12, 53–67.
Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Yahya, S., and T.Ramayah (2014b). Cor-
porate Governance Mechanisms and Jordanian Compa-
nies’ Financial Performance. Asian Social Science 10, 247–
247.
Alabdullah, T. Y., SofriYahya, and Thurasamy, R. (2014c).
Corporate Governance Development: New or Old Con-
cept? European Journal of Business and Management 6,
312–315.
Alfadhl, M. M. A. F. and Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2013). Determi-
nants of the Managerial Behavior of Agency Cost and Its
Influential Extent on Performance: A Study in Iraq. Inter-
national Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 3–3.
Ararat, M., Black, B. S., and Yurtoglu, B. B. (2017). The effect
of corporate governance on firm value and profitability:
Time-series evidence from Turkey.
Arora, A. and C.Sharma (2016). Corporate governance and
firm performance in developing countries: evidence from
India. Corporate governance 16, 420–436.
Chen, X. (2017). Improved Corporate Governance and Chi-
nese Seasoned Equity Offering Announcement Effects.
Accounting & Finance 57, 401–428.
Cheng, E. C. andCourtenay, S.M. (2006). Board composition,
regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The interna-
tional journal of accounting. The International Journal of
Accounting 41, 262–289.
Cuñat, V., Gine, M., and Guadalupe, M. (2012). The vote
is cast: The effect of corporate governance on shareholder
value. The journal of finance. The Journal of Finance 67,
1943–1977.
Dewji, H. and Miller, S. (2013). Assessing the components
of effective corporate governance. Strategic Management
Review 7, 47–63.
Ehikioya, B. I. (2009). Corporate governance structure and
firmperformance in developing economies: evidence from
Nigeria. Corporate Governance 9, 231–243.
Fan, J. P. H. and Wong, T. J. (2001). Do external auditors per-
form a corporate governance role in emerging markets?
Evidence from East Asia. EFA 2001 Barcelona Meetings.
3rd Annual Fin. Mkt. Dev. Conference, Hong Kong. Avail-
able at SSRN.
Fan, P. S. (2004). Review of Literature & Empirical Research
on Corporate Governance’. Monetary Authority of Singa-
pore (MAS) Staff Paper. InTheMonetary Authority of Sin-
gapore.
Forker, J. J. (1992). Corporate Governance and Disclosure
Quality. Accounting and Business research.
Gul, F. A. and Leung, S. (2004). Board Leadership, Outside
Directors’ Expertise andVoluntary Corporate Disclosures.
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23, 351–379.
Gulzar, M. A. (2011). Corporate governance characteristics
and earnings management: Empirical evidence from Chi-
nese listed firms. International Journal of Accounting and
Financial Reporting 1, 133–133.
Haniffa, R. M. and Cooke, T. E. (2005). The Impact of Culture
and Governance on Corporate Social Reporting. Journal
of Accounting and Public Policy 24, 391–430.
I.Dzingai and Fakoya, M. (2017). Effect of Corporate Gov-
ernance Structure on the Financial Performance of Johan-
nesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-ListedMining Firms. . Sus-
tainability 9, 867.
Jensen,M. C. (1993). TheModern Industrial Revolution, Exit,
and The Failure of Internal Control Systems. The Journal
of Finance 48, 831–880.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of The
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.
Jiraporn, P., Jiraporn, N., Boeprasert, A., and Chang, K.
(2014). Does corporate social responsibility (CSR)
improve credit ratings? Evidence From Geographic Iden-
tification. Financial Management 43, 505–531.
Jizi, M. I., A.Salama, Dixon, R., and Stratling, R. (2014). Cor-
porate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility
Disclosure: Evidence From The US Banking Sector. Jour-
nal of Business Ethics 125, 601–615.
Lee, J. W., Kim, Y. M., and Kim, Y. E. (2018). Antecedents
of Adopting Corporate Environmental Responsibility and
Green Practices. Journal of Business Ethics 148, 397–409.
Lenssen, G., Blagov, Y., Bevan, D., Peters, S., Miller, M.,
S.Kusyk, et al. (2011). How relevant is corporate gov-
ernance and corporate social responsibility in emerging
markets. Corporate Governance: The international journal
of business in society.
Lipton, M. and lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal
for improved corporate governance. The business lawyer.
JSTOR 48, 59–77.
Majumder, M. T. H., Akter, A., and Li, X. (2017). Corporate
Governance and Corporate Social Disclosures: A Meta-
Analytical Review. International Journal of Accounting and
Information Management 25.
Mak, Y. T. and Roush, M. L. (2000). Factors Affecting the
Characteristics of Boards of Directors: An Empirical Study
of New Zealand Initial Public Offering Firms. Journal of
Business Research 47.
Manab,N.A., Kassim, I., andR.Hussin,M. (2010). Enterprise-
wide risk management (EWRM) practices: Between cor-
porate governance compliance and value. International
Review of Business Research Papers 6, 239–252.
Journal of Accounting Science j ojs.umsida.ac.id/index.php/JAS
128
July 2019 j Volume 3 j Issue 2
Tariq Tawfeeq Yousif Alabdullah Effect of Board Size
Mang’unyi, E. E. (2011). Ownership Structure and Corpo-
rate Governance and Its Effects on Performance: A Case of
Selected Banks in Kenya. International journal of business
administration 2.
M.Halme and .Huse, M. (1997). The Influence of Corporate
Governance, Industry and Country Factors on Environ-
mental Reporting. Scandinavian Journal of Management
13, 137–157.
Michelon, G. and Parbonetti, A. (2012). The Effect of cor-
porate governance on sustainability disclosure. Journal of
Management and Governance 16, 1–33.
Narwal, K. and Jindal, S. (2015). The impact of corporate gov-
ernance on the profitability: An empirical study of Indian
textile industry. International Journal of Research in Man-
agement, Science & Technology 3, 81–85.
Palaniappan, G. (2017). Determinants of corporate financial
performance relating to board characteristics of corporate
governance in Indian manufacturing industry: An empir-
ical study. . European Journal of Management and Business
Economics. 26(1), 67–85.
Peni, E. and Vähämaa, S. (2012). Did good corporate gov-
ernance improve bank performance during the financial
crisis? Journal of Financial Services Research 41, 19–35.
Rao, K. K., Tilt, C. A., and Lester, L. H. (2012). Corporate
Governance and Environmental Reporting: an Australian
Study. Corporate Governance: The International Journal
of Business in Society. Emerald 12, 143–163.
Sadou, A. et al. (2017). Corporate Social Responsibility Dis-
closures in Malaysia: Evidence From Large Companies.
Social Responsibility Journal 13.
Said, R., Yuserrie, H. Z., andHasnah, H. (2009). The Relation-
ship Between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure
and Corporate Governance Characteristics in Malaysia.
Social Responsibility Journal 5, 212–226.
Tai, F. M. and Chuang, S. H. (2014). Corporate social respon-
sibility 6, 117.
Uwalomwa, U. and Ajibolade, S. (2013). Effects of Corporate
Governance on Corporate Social and Environmental Dis-
closure Among Listed Firms in Nigeria. European Journal
of Business and Social Sciences 2, 76–92.
Yuen, C. Y. D., Liu, M., Zhang, X., and C.Lu (2008). A
Case Study ofVoluntaryDisclosure byChinese Enterprises
Article (PDF Available)  April 2008with256 Reads.
Zahra, S. A. and Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of Directors and
Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integra-
tive Model. Journal of Management 15.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the
research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or
financial relationships that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2019 , and . This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other
forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the
copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publica-
tion in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted aca-
demic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permit-
ted which does not comply with these terms.
Journal of Accounting Science j ojs.umsida.ac.id/index.php/JAS
129
July 2019 j Volume 3 j Issue 2
Tariq Tawfeeq Yousif Alabdullah Effect of Board Size
LIST OF TABLES
1 Measurement of Independent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
2 Sample’s by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3 Frequency Table for Board Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4 Frequencyfor CEO Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5 Path Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Journal of Accounting Science j ojs.umsida.ac.id/index.php/JAS
130
July 2019 j Volume 3 j Issue 2
Tariq Tawfeeq Yousif Alabdullah Effect of Board Size
TABLE 1 jMeasurement of Independent Variables
Indepen-
dent
Variables
Measurement
Board Size ``BSIZ'': Total Number of Directors in the board.(Said et al. (2009)
CEO Duality ``CEO DUALITY'': CEO of company holds the chairman position as well in the board.''1'' score given if
the CEO holds the chairman position, and ``0'' score given if otherwise Said et al. (2009)
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TABLE 2 j Sample's by Sector
Sector Number of Company Number of Sample Percentage (%)
Trading and Services 212 45 36
Construction 46 34 27
Property 94 46 37
Total 352 125 100
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TABLE 3 j Frequency Table for Board Size
Number of Director Frequency Percent
4 3 2.4
5 8 6.4
6 17 13.6
7 23 18.4
8 25 20.0
9 22 17.6
10 9 7.2
11 6 4.8
12 6 4.8
13 2 1.6
14 3 2.4
15 1 0.8
Total 125 100
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TABLE 4 j Frequencyfor CEO Duality
CEO Duality Frequency Percent
No 116 92.8
Yes 9 7.2
Total 125 100
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TABLE 5 j Path Coefficient
Hypothesis Path Path Coefficient Standard Error T-Value(1 tailed) Decision
H1 BSIZE ®CSRD 0.148 0.089 1.667 Accept
H2 CEO ® CSRD -0.110 0.081 1.351 Reject
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